Territorial revisionism in the wake of the War in Ukraine

A report on radical and far-right discourse
About the project

Russia’s war against Ukraine has opened a brand-new front for disinformation and influence operations. A major influx of refugees in neighbouring countries is creating avenues for exploitation of local nationalism, xenophobia and anti-Western narratives, already on the rise.

This research is part of the project UKRAINE MONITOR (Monitoring of Networks of Influence Tactics and Operations in the Region), which tries to document these phenomena and disseminate the information to relevant parties.

The project aims to check out how Ukraine-related disinformation is reflected and used within the far-right, ultra-nationalist and extremist communities to advance goals consistent with Russian interests. Particular attention is paid to instances of cross-country cooperation between the assessed communities, the narratives that they share, and the extent to which there is coordination for advancing similar agendas.

Within this project, we monitor online and social media activity among extreme groups in each of the countries mentioned above and analyse indications of convergence, communication, or coordination. The results will be communicated to relevant audiences with a role in stemming the spread of Russian malign influence and propaganda.

Who we are.

GlobalFocus Center (Romania) has partnered with Political Capital (Hungary) European Western Balkans (Serbia) and Reporters’ Foundation (Poland). All partners have already extensively documented Russian-aligned propaganda and malign influence in Central-Eastern Europe, the Western Balkans and the Black Sea area/ Eastern Partnership countries.
Introduction

When speaking of territorial revisionism, the situation is unique in each country. This is partly due to the different frontier grievances held by nationalists and far-right groups but also due to the variable degree of compatibility between these grievances and Russian interests and propaganda.

In the case of Romania, Russian troops are present on the territory of the Republic of Moldova, perceived as part of the motherland by Romanian nationalists. In Poland, there is historical opposition to Russia but a partition of Ukraine would align with the interests of some nationalist groups. In Hungary, there is compatibility between the interests of Russia and those of the revisionist nationalists. Finally, Serbia has no common frontier with Ukraine but some hope that a stronger presence of Russia in the Balkans would help - mainly through reducing Western influence - foster Serbian territorial ambitions as seen by nationalists.

Still, nationalist discourse in each country had similarities even before the war started. In every country, nationalists have a dream of Great(er) Serbia / Romania / Poland / Hungary and they feel they have been historically wronged and frustrated in achieving this dream. This may be reflected even in similar slogans: “Bessarabia is Romania”, “Lviv is Poland”, “Kosovo is Serbia”. Thus, nationalists in these countries are susceptible to promises that (part of) this dream can be achieved due to the war and under Russian patronage.

Thus, in all three countries bordering Ukraine, we found narratives promoting the partition of Ukraine between its neighbours, or at least some form of land grab. In Serbia, the one country within this project’s scope with which Ukraine does not share a border, there is a narrative promoting a “New European Order” where a stronger Russia, more present in the region would help the Serbian nationalists achieve their national interest.

Government and public opinion

In Poland and Romania, both the government and the population support Ukraine. Thus, nationalists supporting partition have had to tread carefully so as not to turn society against them.

In Hungary and Serbia, the governments, at least, have a dual position. On the one hand they have declared their support for Ukraine’s integrity. On the other hand, they support putting pressure on Ukraine to negotiate and implicitly for it to give in to Russia’s demands. The semi-official anti-Ukraine positions and the far-right, anti-Ukraine, openly revisionist positions may end up reinforcing each other,
Romania

Baseline: Frontier issues in Romania before the Ukraine war

To the North and East, Romania is bordered by the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. The Republic of Moldova (formerly known as Bessarabia) is part of the historic territory of the principality of Moldavia and is populated by a majority of Romanian-speakers.¹ For these reasons, support of a union between the Republic of Moldova and Romania is practically a prerequisite in order to be recognised as a “true nationalist” in Romania.

Mainstream politicians also need to pay homage to the unity of the two peoples – most of them make sure to say this should happen within the EU in order to assuage any fears of Romanian imperialism. This allows them to conflate the issue of unification with the support for Moldovan accession to the EU, which is a major diplomatic objective of Romania.²

The most important far right party, AUR (Alliance for the Unity of Romanians), which has a significant parliamentary presence, is explicitly pro-unification. It has a sister party also called AUR in the Republic of Moldova. Interestingly, the AUR logo puts the EU stars over what would be the territory of the Republic, thus allowing the party to use the same conflation strategy like the mainstream politicians.

To the North of Romania lies “Northern Bukovina”, the Romanian denomination for the Ukrainian region around Cernăuți/Chernivtsi, which has a small minority of Romanian-speakers and was at some point part of Romania. This “historic injustice”, and the situation of Romanian-speakers in Ukraine, is a longstanding issue for Romanian nationalists and the AUR.³

Snake Island, the offshore Ukrainian territory widely known for having resisted Russian occupation⁴, also belonged to Romania until 1948.⁵ Romania and Ukraine had an

¹ https://www.britannica.com/place/Moldova
³ https://visegradpost.com/fr/2021/09/19/george-simion-lallemande-controle-une-grande-partie-des-nos-affaires-interieures-et-exterieures/. It should be noted, however, that before the second Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 the issue of minority rights was also a point of contention between Romania and Ukraine (https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/romania-si-legea-educatiei-din-ucraina/29023309.html). And
international dispute over the economic exclusive rights around the island, eventually coming to a resolution in 2009 that was very favourable to Romania. The island, however, is generally sparsely inhabited so there is little nationalist interest in it.

To the West lies Hungary, with which Romania has had a long historical dispute over Transylvania. Nationalists claim to fear Hungarian revisionism (while at the same time praising Viktor Orban for his sovereigntist positions). Such concerns are occasionally echoed among more mainstream audiences.

Finally, in the South East lies the Cadrilater / Southern Dobrudja, a small region acquired by Romania from Bulgaria during the Second Balkan War and returned during World War 2. The interest for this region is minimal among both nationalists and the general public, but maps of „Greater Romania” tend to include the region within the borders.

Main narratives and subnarratives

Territorial anxiety. The war is presented by some voices from the far right as a danger to the frontiers of the Romanian state in relation to neighbouring Hungary. One such sub-narrative is the danger of Ukrainization of Romania interpreted as a losing part of Transylvania. This narrative is less prominent than the other narratives in this report, possibly because it conflicts with the Russian narrative that Ukraine is to blame for the war. We have discussed it in greater detail in the report related to Ukrainization.

Another sub-narrative insists on the dangers arising from the fact that the Romanian authorities have chosen to be opposed to the Russian operation in Ukraine. These dangers remain often un-named, but, given that historically most of the disputes between Romania/ Romanian principalities and Russia / USSR / Tsarist empire were territorial, the clear implication is that “Romanian” territory (either in Romania or the Republic of Moldova) could be invaded.

Territorial grief and territorial revisionism in relation to Ukraine and Republic of Moldova.

The general nationalist discourse about territories lost to the Soviet Union has been repurposed in two ways. One narrative, that of territorial grief, says that Romanians should never forget the territorial losses to Ukraine. Considering that Ukraine chooses to

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7 https://www.rri.ro/en_gb/80_years_since_romania_ceded_southern_dobruja-2624711
keep “Romanian” territories, Romania should not consider Ukraine a friend and, therefore, should not help Ukraine. Some tense moments between Ukraine and Moldova are occasionally raised as an additional argument. It is, essentially, a pro-neutrality narrative in the current war.

Another narrative present is that the war is an opportunity to “regain” some territory. We call this the territorial revisionism narrative and it comes in two flavours; it says that Romania should use the opportunity of the war either to “take back” territories form Ukraine or, in more rare cases, somehow promote unification with the Republic of Moldova.

The line between the two narratives is, in practice, oftentimes blurred as they are spoken by the same people, build on largely the same description of historic events and affirm the same “historic rights”. Thus, the two narratives support each other with the milder territorial grief narrative arguably paving the ground for the more assertive territorial revisionism narrative. The usage of one or the other is sometimes a case of sheer opportunism. The territorial grief narrative was delivered particularly on Facebook (which is the more generalist platform) and was done more prominently at the beginning of the war. This appears to have been done as an effort to dissuade Romanians from supporting Ukraine. The territorial revisionism narrative, on the other hand, is more prominent on Telegram, a platform preferred for more radical messages due to the relative absence of moderation. By the time of writing this report this narrative took a step towards the mainstream due to the support of former minister Andrei Marga.

Evolutions and examples

On Facebook, which is used to reach a more mainstream audience, messages deploiring “historical injustices” on the northern and eastern borders were present mostly at the beginning of the war. This coincides with the period of peak interest on the issue among the general population, as suggested by online searches as seen on Google Trends.
Above: Evolution of social media interactions among GlobalFocus’ list of radical and far right voices. Below: Evolution of public online interest, as estimated through Google searches. Cernivtsi continues to be a significant migration hub which probably explains at least in part why searches have not returned to pre-war levels.

Translation: WHY DOES UKRAINE NOT RETURN TO ROMANIA NORTHERN BUKOVINA HERȚA SERPENT ISLAND SOUTHERN BESSARABIA..? BECAUSE THOSE WHO LEAD NOW ROMANIA ARE NOT PATRIOTS THEY ARE THIEVES

Nicolae Voiculeț 07.03/2022

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9 Data and graph: Crowdtangle. Search terms available at: https://tinyurl.com/3x93ne7x
10 Data and graph: Google Trends https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?geo=RO&q=%2Fm%2F09ptq,%2Fm%2F01_w5q,%2Fg%121md wp
Message by AUR (far right) MP Nicolae Voiculeț

Translation:
💙💛❤️ Let's get rid of the Prut customs

Retrospective of, the situation of Bessarabia from 1917/1918 to 1991/1992, and more recently 2022 we can understand that this fragile land has always been torn between two existential options.

Pro-unification message. The video overlays military images and a fascist song.

As the war carried on, the number of impressions for this kind of message strongly decreased (even though messages continued to be written).

It is interesting to note that some revisionist messages related to Ukraine were systematically promoted even before the invasion started. On December 5th, 2021, a post was published on a Facebook group dedicated to the far-right politician Ioan Popa from Right Alternative, a non-parliamentary party. Over more than 2000 words, a list of occasions where Ukraine has harmed Romania was presented. Among the main accusations were claims that Ukraine not only has “historically Romanian” territories but also that is one of the main factors preventing the unification of the Republic of Moldova with Romania.

1. In 1918 they wanted the annexation of Bessarabia and only the military presence of the Romanians forced the withdrawal of this demand;

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11 https://www.facebook.com/154719474224/posts/10160214801904225
12 https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=968044594102220
13 https://www.facebook.com/groups/373378467639194/posts/455413386102368
2. In 1945 they wanted the annexation of Bessarabia and only Stalin’s pressure forced the withdrawal of this demand; (...) 

3. Arbitrarily, Ukraine holds the following Romanian territories: four-fifths of historic Maramures (the Upper and Lower Apsa, Barjava, Tisza River), Northern historic Bukovina, Bugeac (Ismail, White Fortress), Snake Island, all given to them by the former Soviets. (...) 

4. One of the main problems standing in the way of the reunification of the two Romanian states is precisely Ukraine, which shows even greater opposition than Russia; 

The text was copied and pasted in almost 400 posts and over 200 comments. Political Capital and GlobalFocus have been able to clearly identify coordinated behaviour, apparently related to an intention to create hostility towards Ukraine before and immediately after the invasion. 

According to our qualitative analysis, on Telegram, which is typically the network of choice for people, who are already radicalised due to the perceived censorship on Facebook\(^\text{14}\), messages followed a similar curve. However, the interest remains clearly above the baseline (pre-invasion) period. 

This suggests that the narrative is maintained among radical circles awaiting more favourable times to be promoted in the general population. General online monitoring done by GlobalFocus suggests that a radicalisation of the far-right discourse on general (i.e. less radical) social media is already taking place and could intensify during this fall thanks to potential dissatisfaction with high inflation rates. 

\(^{14}\) As seen consistently in GlobalFocus’ monitoring of online toxic narratives
Translation: The Americans killed Saddam Hussein as they wished, Rothschild has paid off Ukraine's debt and now he owns it. They want to occupy Europe, and create pseudo war in Ukraine, with their mercenaries who keep coming, keep coming. Romania is sold out, Iohannis is waiting to take office as NATO director. Elizabeth, the owner of Romania, has put Carlo to personally supervise the extraction of tons of gold from Rosia Montana, which now belongs to them.

And the Romanians KNOW NOTHING!
If we were a united people and respectful of each other, we would succeed to make our country what it is, the richest, and best strategically located, and to recover all that we have belonged to us. Putin once gave us our territories, and I think he would accept [again] if proposed by a newly created government of patriots and specialists.

We have the ONLY senator who is who puts herself on the line every day for her country and her people. [...] and the ONLY European denstor [MEP?] Terhes Cristian and the AUR party. The united people are MISSING!!!!!
Translation: What does Ukraine mean to us?

Ever since it acquired historically Romanian territories given to us as a gift by USSR, Ukraine has been conducting an aggressive policy towards Romania but especially towards ethnic Romanians on its current territory. Romanians in Ukraine have been constantly losing rights; nowadays they have very few classes taught in Romanian language, thus they are assimilated forcibly by laws and pressure from Ukrainian state, but also from Ukrainian nationalists. However, we prefer a neighbour like Ukraine, from the geopolitical perspective, as a buffer between historical Romanian territories and the everlasting imperialist Russia.

But we will never accept the occupation of the ancestral lands that were part of Moldova of Stefan the Great and Holy, Bessarabia, Bukovina and Herta, which are occupied by abuse even today!

But even though the Romanian people shown solidarity and humanity in the Ukrainian refugee crisis, as is it Christian and normal, and many even of us have been involved in helping these desperate and unfortunate people, we cannot accept this new "trend" that has sweeping the globe ...

While writing this report, Andrei Marga, philosopher, several times minister of Education and with a short stint as minister of Foreign Affairs, now retired from politics, took a strong revisionist and pro-Kremlin position. 

We have on our hands an absolutely special situation and I say it taking full responsibility, Ukraine has unnatural borders.

It has to cede territory to Hungary - Transcarpathia, to Poland - Galicia, to Romania - Bukovina and to Russia - Donbas and Crimea. These are territories of other countries.

We persist, that's it, there will be conflict.

And I end here, let's be very clear: as long as it is not resolved through a discussion with America and Russia, Germany, Ukraine and China and an agreement is not reached, there will be no peace in Europe. Without peace, democracy will suffer.

(Andrei Marga)

When confronted later on Mr Marga insisted that his declaration represent the “historical truth”

The declarations had considerable impact both at home and abroad. On Crowdtangle, there were more than 300 000 interactions in Romanian and more than 100 000 reactions in other languages.

Interactions in Romanian.

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17 https://apps.crowdtangle.com/search?customStartDate=2022-09-15T07:48:36&customEndDate=2022-09-22T07:48:36&Languages=ro&platform=facebook&postTypes=&producerTypes=3,1,2&q=%22Andrei%20Marga%22&sortBy=score&sortOrder=desc&timeframe=custom
18 https://apps.crowdtangle.com/search?customStartDate=2022-09-15T20:59:59&customEndDate=2022-09-22T07:48:36&excludedLanguages=ro&platform=facebook&postTypes=&producerTypes=3,1,2&q=%22Andrei%20Marga%22&sortBy=score&sortOrder=desc&timeframe=custom
Interactions in other languages (high rate of false positives on language).

Similarly, on Newswhip, there were around 650 articles on the issue (all languages). The impact was felt especially in Ukrainian\textsuperscript{19} and Russian\textsuperscript{20} media and it was carried by Sputnik in other languages\textsuperscript{21}. In Hungary (from the project countries) there was a limited reaction, with 86 articles (according to Newswhip), some of which argued that Romania too can be seen as having “unnatural frontiers”.

\textsuperscript{19} https://ziare.com/andrei-marga/declaratii-andrei-marga-presa-kiev-1761752
\textsuperscript{21} https://sputniknews.lat/20220918/las-fronteras-de-la-ucrania-moderna-son-antinaturales-y-kiev-deberia-ceder-partes-de-su-territorio-1130574021.html
Poland

History

In Poland, the issue of territorial revision mainly concerned territories that belonged to the Second Polish Republic during the interwar period (1918-1939). In 1945, the former eastern borderlands of Poland (also referred to as Kresy) were ceded to the Soviet Union and subsequently, after the collapse of the USSR, became the western frontiers of Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine.

Source of map: US Holocaust Memorial Museum

Both historical and contemporary issues, especially concerning politics toward national minorities in these areas, still arouse emotions and are deliberately exploited both by Russian propaganda - in order to cause tensions between Poland and its neighbours - as well as by nationalists and right-wing politicians targeting groups for whom the issues of the Eastern Borderlands remain an important part of their identity.

22 https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/map/poland-1945
In recent years, numerous cases of exploitation of territorial revisionism by Russian propaganda have been recorded (often with a contribution by far-right actors), with the several notable examples:

- as per revisionism in Polish-Belarusian relations:

  in 2020, during the Belarusian opposition protests against the rigged elections, the thread of the alleged Polish desire to regain Grodno appeared in Lukashenka's speech after the editor of the extreme right-wing portal "High Time" (Najwyższy Czas), Tomasz Sommer, tweeted: "It is absolutely obvious that Grodno should, in case of the break-up of Belarus, go to Poland. PiS knows it but is afraid to say it. " This claim was also spread by Mateusz Piskorski.

  "It is absolutely obvious that Grodno should, in case of the break-up of Belarus, go to Poland. PiS knows it but is afraid to say it. "

  "Jest reż zupełnie oczywiste, że Grodno powinno, w przypadku rozpadu Białorusi, trafić do Polski. PiS to wie, ale boi się powiedzieć.

  4:23 PM · 21 sier 2020 · Twitter Web App

  74 Tweety podane dalej  211 Cytatów z Tweeta  405 Polubień

  https://twitter.com/1972tomek/status/1296815287740792832
In 2015, the candidate of the Kukiz party, Aleksander K., ran in the elections with the slogan "Territorial expansion for Poland", describing Lithuania as "the territorial beneficiary of the September (1939 - ed.) aggression against Poland" and threatening Lithuania with "responding to the anti-Polish policy of the post-Shaulist regime with force". His message was explored in pro-Russian propaganda media\textsuperscript{23}. In 2016 Aleksander K. was charged with a hate crime against Lithuanians, under the diplomatic protocol from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{23} Kukiz's Candidate: Possible use of force against the so-called Lithuania (15.10.2015, \textit{Independent Political Daily})
\textsuperscript{24} Kukiz's candidate before the court. He wanted to regain "Polish Vilnius". He threatened Lithuania with military intervention (20.10.2016, \textit{Wyborcza.pl})
Aleksander K. was also interested in Polish-Ukrainian relations, appearing to align with narratives propagated by the Kremlin on the issue of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. In one film he proclaimed "As an MP, I will propose to organise a meeting in Warsaw with representatives of the governments of Hungary, Romania and Russia in order to discuss and determine the division of the lands that are now part of the collapsing Ukrainian state"\(^{25}\) (a trope which we explore further in the report).

A similar case was Marcin Skalski, a Polish nationalist cooperating at the time with Kresy.pl and currently with wPrawo.pl, whose pro-Russian activities were covered by Marcin Rey, an authority on pro-Kremlin propaganda. Skalski was, among others, the originator of the "Vilnius People’s Republic" website that insisted on "sending Polish 'little green men' to Vilnius region and holding a referendum among its native people" (similar to Russian tactics in Donbas)\(^ {26}\). Skalski is currently involved in activities against the "Ukrainization of Poland"\(^ {27}\) (cf. report on Ukrainization\(^ {28}\)).

**Revisionism in Polish-Ukrainian relations before 2022**

The areas of present-day Ukraine, which belonged to the Second Polish Republic before the war, include present-day Lviv, Volyn, Rivne, Tarnopol and Ivankofrankivsk oblasts.

Sentiments toward the Polish-Ukrainian borderlands, most often manifested in the slogan of "Lviv is Poland" (analogous to "Vilnius is Poland"), are naturally present among the groupings of the Polish minority living in these borderlands and the descendants of Poles displaced from those areas post-war; however, they are also exploited by the extreme right.

\(^ {25}\) Kukiz’s candidate before the court. He wanted to regain "Polish Vilnius". He threatened Lithuania with military intervention (20.10.2016, [wyborcza.pl](https://wyborcza.pl))


\(^ {27}\) Ukrainization in the shade of Braun (07.08.2022, [vsquare.org](https://vsquare.org))

\(^ {28}\) report on Ukrainization
Vandals wrote “Polish Lviv / Z” on a solidarity monument in Poland; a post was shared by a disinformation account on Twitter identified as led by a pro-Russian nationalist from Lublin in 2021, DFR Lab identified a network of Facebook pages distributing information critical of opposition parties and promoting the news outlet “propolski.pl”, that belonged to Jakub Givi Gigitashvili and Esteban Ponce de León, “Network of Facebook pages amplified Polish right-wing and tabloid media outlets”, (04.11.2021, Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab))
Zgierski, associated with the Media Narodowe ("national media", one of main right wing media outlet). Some pages with names such as "Vilnius is Poland," "Lviv is Poland," were using this resentment to target their audiences.

Facebook also has a network of groups and websites such as "Lviv is forever Polish" associated with the "We remember Volhynia" foundation, which, under the guise of cultivating historical memory, engages in anti-Ukrainian hate.30

However, it’s important to note that among a large number of circles associated with the eastern borderlands, the anti-Russian attitude is even stronger than the anti-Ukrainian sentiment, therefore, in the face of the Russian invasion, they refrain from exacerbating the situation.

The Polish radical right already helped spread the pro-Kremlin narrative targeting Romania and Hungary in 2014, prior to annexation of Crimea. At the time, Polish far-right websites informed the Maidan revolution might end up with Romania and Hungary taking over Ukrainian territories inhabited by national minorities; information was received with interest and further disseminated by the organizers of the March of Independence (the biggest nationalist rally in Poland).31

In 2015, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the now deceased leader of the misleadingly named, Kremlin-approved far-right Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, asked Polish, Hungarian and Romanian authorities to participate in the partitioning of Ukraine.32 His letter was dismissed but Polish public media reported on his request. A map illustrating Zhirinovsky’s idea was shown on TVP1 to illustrate the provocation; it shows the new territory of Ukraine, without Volhynia and Lviv, which are part of Poland, and without Crimea, Odesa and the so-called “Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics”, annexed by Russia. Ukrainian borders end on the Dnieper. Although the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially called Zhirinovsky’s “open letter” bizarre, it didn’t stop Russian propaganda from

[footnotes]

30 Remembrance and hate (26.04.2022, frontstory.pl)
31 Nationalists want to take part in the partition of Ukraine. This is not only impossible but also detrimental to our foreign relations (27.01.2014, natemat.pl)
32 State Duma to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs: let’s divide Ukraine (23.03.2014, tvp.info)
33 ditto
34 ditto
using the incident for its own agenda: soon after, the map was circulated in Russian media as a “Polish proposal.”

In 2018, Russian media went as far as faking a Polish television programme claiming that “Poland openly makes its territorial claims to Ukraine." The programme was a weather forecast from TVN where the meteorological map included Lviv and Vilnius.

“Revisionist” disinformation during war

The spin described above was recycled by Kremlin propaganda during the Russian invasion. On March 24, Illia Kyva, a former member of the Ukrainian far-right Right Sector party who recently defected to Russia, posted the aforementioned map back on his Telegram account. This gave rise to a mass replication of the claim in many languages, aimed at convincing Ukrainians that the partition of their country is being prepared by a coalition including its western and southern neighbours, but also inciting, for example, Romanians to discuss Bukovina (see former part of report).

35 The partition of Ukraine on Russian TV. Żyrinowski accuses the Poles: you took too much! (16.02.2015 tvn24.pl)
36 Poland openly makes its territorial claims to Ukraine (31.10.2018, News Front)
In late April, Sergey Naryshkin, director of Russia’s foreign intelligence agency (SVR), proclaimed that Poland and the USA are conspiring to gain control over Western Ukraine, and that Poland wanted to send its troops to Ukraine only so that it could then regain Lviv and the former Borderlands.

This conspiracy theory surfaces even alongside news of president Zelenskyy’s proposing a bill to give Poles permits to reside and work in Ukraine. Pro-Russian outlets reported that “Ukraine is handing part of its territory to Warsaw” and replicated the tropes of “Ukrainization” and “Ukropolin” being built at the cost of Polish national identity and Ukrainian territorial integrity.

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Poles are preparing to populate Lviv on preferential terms - Rogov

June 1, 2022
1937

The Polish authorities practically ceased to hide that they decided to finally “softly” annex Western Ukraine. Citizens of the country are already being offered to buy apartments in installments in the still Ukrainian city of Lvov.

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37 The Kremlin’s absurd reports: Poland, in cooperation with the US, wants to take over Western Ukraine (28.04.2022 wp.pl)
38 “The collapse of Ukraine is inevitable.” Why Kyiv grants special rights to the Poles (28.05.2022 gazeta.ru)
Article framing Polish-Ukrainian cooperation as an attempt to annex Western Ukraine, illustrated with an archival picture from March of Independence (as old as 2016) - the banner says “there is no Poland without Lviv”.

In late July, another “partition map” was posted by former president of Russia Dmitry Medvedev on his Telegram account.

Interestingly, in Poland, the threads were reproduced only by the media closely linked to pro-Russian circles, such as Myśl Polska.

Jan Engelgard, Przemysław Piasta, Mateusz Piskorski and Adam Śmiech were debating the Medvedev’s “proposal” on Mysł Polska

At the same time, the popularity of the conspiracy theory about “partition of Ukraine” in the Russian-language media shows that Russian propaganda does not care at all about the

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39 https://t.me/medvedev_telegram/150
scarce source material on the Polish side, creating its narrative with the help of complete fakes or entirely manipulating statements by Polish politicians⁴⁰.

**Serbia**

The topic of territorial revisionism in the Balkans has been on the agenda of extreme right-wing groups and media outlets in Serbia since the 1990s. Even though the wars in the region concluded more than twenty years ago, these groups have never accepted the current borders in the post-Yugoslav area as final.

In addition to the strong opposition⁴¹ to the independence of Kosovo and the belief that Serbia should re-establish full sovereignty over it “when the international circumstances allow it”, the Serbian far-right has also promoted (preferably peaceful, but violent scenarios have not been disowned) re-unification with Montenegro and Republika Srpska (see, for example, the Tweet of Boško Obradović below), a political entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus denying the independence and territorial integrity of these countries. Parts of the territories of other countries in the region, such as Croatia and North Macedonia, have also been included⁴² in the maximalist goals of the “Greater Serbia project”.

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⁴⁰ Poles proclaimed partition of Ukraine, Medvedev said (06.05.2022, ria.ru)
⁴² Balkan Insight: Greater Serbia was Šešelj’s goal, [https://balkaninsight.com/sr/2013/06/10/%C5%A1e%C5%ADeljev-cilj-bila-velika-srbija/](https://balkaninsight.com/sr/2013/06/10/%C5%A1e%C5%ADeljev-cilj-bila-velika-srbija/)

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The most famous imagining of the Greater Serbia by the Serbian far-right; Source: Wikipedia
An example of the narrative was recently provided by the leader of the far-right Dveri party Boško Obradović, who in August 2022 published personal photos of his vacations in Montenegro, adding that he supported the idea that “Serbs should spend their summer vacation in their own country”. “Montenegro and Serbia – this is a single family! It will also be a single country once again! Just wait!”, Obradović wrote on Twitter.

Since the start of the war in Ukraine, there have been several attempts by the far right-actors to draw a parallel between these events and the situation in the Balkans, as well as expressions of hope (all examples are quoted below) that “the new European” order created by Russia would allow Serbia to achieve its territorial goals. The research, however, has shown that there has been only a handful of direct and unambiguous examples of these narratives, which is fewer than might have been expected.

This finding might be explained by the fact that the majority of Serbian citizens are against military conflicts in the region, even when it comes to Kosovo. According to the poll conducted by the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy43, published in March 2022, 45% of the citizens believe that Serbia should not intervene militarily if the safety of Serbs in Kosovo was jeopardized, while 40% believe it should do so. For Bosnia and Herzegovina, the numbers were 52-32 in favour of non-intervention, while for Montenegro, they were 53-31. Only about 20% of citizens said they were ready to go to the war themselves, while about 70% said they would not be willing to do so.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that territorial revisionism in the Balkans does not remain a major topic for the far-right actors. These narratives have become especially worrying in the context of the rising tensions in the Western Balkans, especially between Serbia and

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Kosovo, which included an escalation\(^{44}\) over the issues of recognition of licence plates and ID cards at the end of July and the beginning of August. This escalation, which almost led to skirmishes\(^{45}\) between Kosovo Serbs and the Kosovo police forces, is not directly related to the war in Ukraine, as the disputes on these issues already broke out in September 2021; however, the fragile security situation in the region was put in the context of the deteriorating European security architecture. As of the conclusion of this report, the two sides have achieved\(^{46}\) an EU-mediated agreement on mutual recognition of ID cards, though the issue of licence plates remains unresolved.

**A New European order in which Russia would support Serbian aspirations**

In May 2022, multiple right-wing media outlets, including Srbijajavlja.rs\(^{47}\) and Objektivno.net\(^{48}\), reported that the Russian political analyst Aleksandr Dugin apparently stated that “once Russia finishes the job in Ukraine, it will come to the Balkans”. According to these media outlets, Dugin announced that the war in Ukraine was a “turning point for the Russian geopolitical agenda of Slavic awakening”.

“You will later see the benefits concerning the Balkans. And now, we need to finish what we started in Ukraine”, Dugin assessed.

His (alleged) statements were also quoted by influential anti-globalist economist Branko Dragaš, in a Facebook post that generated numerous reactions. “We owe Kosovo to the Serbs. It is a historic and moral duty of Russia that Kosovo is once again Serbian”, a part of the quote reads.


\(^{45}\) [https://kossev.info/sirena-za-uzbunu-u-kosovskoj-mitrovici/](https://kossev.info/sirena-za-uzbunu-u-kosovskoj-mitrovici/)


\(^{47}\) [https://www.srbijajavlja.rs/2022/05/dugin-otkrio-putinove-planove-kad-zavrsimo-posao-u-ukrajini-dolazimo-na-balkan/](https://www.srbijajavlja.rs/2022/05/dugin-otkrio-putinove-planove-kad-zavrsimo-posao-u-ukrajini-dolazimo-na-balkan/)

He apparently added that Russia would always support Serbia and stand by it because it is a “brotherly nation”.

This story was soon followed by statements, quoted below, from several Russian sources that “Kosovo is Serbia”, highlighting the Serbian national interests that Russia supports.

In June, the President of the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic”, Denis Pushilin, said that “everything will be Russia except Kosovo, Kosovo is Serbia”. This statement was reported by the right-wing Pravda.rs49 and multiple other outlets. The same statement was repeated by Maryana Naumova, Russian athlete, who, also in June, recorded a video from the Russian-occupied city of Mariupol.

In July 2022, influential Serbian YouTuber and an editor of the popular channel *Balkan info* Teša Tešanović, known for promoting conspiracy theorists and right-wing extremists, promoted the narrative\(^\text{51}\) that Russia would influence Balkan geopolitics, by coming out of the war more as a powerful force in Europe, in a guest appearance on a similar channel, *Slavija info*.

“When Russia reaches the Danube... we will have a direct link with them and they will be able to supply us with weapons, in case there are problems. Geopolitically, here in the Balkans, it would change our relations with Albanians, Bosniaks, Croats”, Tešanović said.

He did not describe how these relations would change exactly, but the implication of territorial revisionism was clear.

**Parallels with Russia and Ukraine applied to the Serbia-Kosovo dispute**

Superficial and often baseless parallels between the war in Ukraine and the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo have been drawn several times since February. Far-right commentators and media in Serbia have interpreted it in a way that legitimised Serbian territorial claims in

Kosovo by comparing Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti to Ukrainian President Volodymir Zelensky in a negative tone – that way implicitly legitimising Russian military aims as well.

In August, 2022, officer Ljubinko Đurković, a participant of the 1998-1999 war in Kosovo, stated on Kurir television, that Albin Kurti is setting his (political) aims higher and higher “much like Volodymir Zelensky”. This portrayal of Kurti was coupled with him being described as somebody who was provoking Serbia, which was rhetoric similar to the Russian justification of the war in Ukraine.

Another person who compared Serbia to Russia and Kosovo to Ukraine was Ukrainian MP Oleksiy Honcharenko who, on 31 July, tweeted that Serbia was trying to start an aggressive war “precisely according to Putin’s method”. “As I said, Serbia is Putin’s Trojan horse in Europe”, Hincharenko wrote. This tweet was heavily criticised by the right-wing media in Serbia, but only for the fact that Serbia was marked as an aggressor, and not because of the comparison with Russia.

Meaning, variations and history

In Hungary, the topic of territorial revisionism regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war is primarily present in the communication of far-right actors. However, while the Hungarian government has expressed its commitment to Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty, it also legitimises the Kremlin's demands. Pro-Russian sites frequently publish on the topic to spread uncertainty and confusion and incite tensions.

Narratives of the far-right

The topic of territorial revisionism mostly appears in the communication of far-right leaders and organisations (e.g., in speeches, and social media postings). Some Hungarian far-right actors think that Russia's war against Ukraine could allow Hungary to gain autonomous status for Ukraine's Zakarpatia oblast (Transcarpathia region) or even regain this territory. This position is based on four fundamentals: 1) Transcarpathia (referred to as Subcarpathia in the Hungarian discourse) was part of 'Greater Hungary' that existed until 1920 when Hungary lost 2/3 of its territory due to the Trianon Peace Treaty, which ended WWI for Hungary. 2) The proportion of the Hungarian population in the area is still significant, around 125,000. 3) The centralised Ukrainian state does not provide adequate rights to the Hungarian minority. (At the same time, the tactics of the Kremlin - which used the rights violations and alleged separatist aspirations of the Russian minority for the territorial disintegration of Ukraine - blocked the demands of the Hungarian minority for more adequate rights.) 4) Far-right actors do not consider Ukraine a legitimate state. According to them, Ukraine is a fake mafia state, which was put together artificially from "donations" from Polish, Russian and Hungarian territories.

Two main narratives can be differentiated:

- **Transcarpathia needs autonomy**: This is one of the main narratives of the far-right party Our Homeland (Mi Hazánk) regarding the war. According to this narrative, Ukraine's Zakarpattia oblast (Transcarpathia region) must receive autonomous status within the country, and this principle has to be the basis of a reorganised (and...
The basis of the narrative is that the Ukrainian independence referendum held in 1991, in which the residents of Zakarpattia oblast (Transcarpathia region) were also asked about the region’s special self-governance status. While the vast majority supported the province’s autonomy, the central government denied the area autonomy in 1992.

- **Transcarpathia should become part of Hungary again:** The narrative spreads the idea that Transcarpathia should be part of Hungary again. According to Our Homeland, in case of Ukraine’s territorial disintegration, Hungary should demand Transcarpathia be a Hungarian territory again. Hence, a commitment to the territorial integrity of Ukraine is not in Hungary’s interest. According to the far-right paramilitary Hungarian Self Defence Movement (Magyar Önvédelmi Mozgalom), this is “not a revisionist nostalgia but the only rational vision.” According to Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement (HVIM), just like a hundred years ago, today Hungary still has the right to its historical territories and “we will get them back at the first opportunity.”

**The communication of the government**

The Hungarian government has a clear and consistent position on the subject: they are committed to and support Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Yet, the government’s communication seems to have another face as well. Since the beginning of the current Russian aggression against Ukraine, the Hungarian government has considered the Kremlin’s security demands legitimate. According to government officials, Ukraine cannot win the war, and the West’s policies (e.g., sanctions and arms supplies) only prolong the war. Hence, in Viktor Orbán’s view, US-Russian negotiations and satisfying the Kremlin’s demands are necessary to achieve peace. However, this argument goes against the government’s commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty because it denies Ukraine’s autonomous capacity to act and decide, its right to self-defence, and, ultimately, its sovereignty.

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59 Autonomy for Transcarpathia! – Mi Hazánk protested (04.03.2022, mihazank.hu)
60 Fact-check: Is there really a referendum result, based on which one can demand autonomy for Transcarpathia? (03.06.2022, telex.hu)
61 Mi Hazánk: we don’t want to be either an American marching ground or a country under Russian “protection” (09.03.2022, kuruc.info)
62 Toroczkai: “The unipolar world order is behind the war!” (04.03.2022, kuruc.info)
63 “We spit on the territorial integrity of Ukraine” - XXI. Trianon March (updated with speeches) (10.06.2022, Szent Korona Rádió)
64 “We spit on the territorial integrity of Ukraine” - XXI. Trianon March (updated with speeches) (10.06.2022, Szent Korona Rádió)
65 Viktor Orbán: Hungary supports the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine (22.02.2022, hirado.hu), Péter Szijjártó: Hungary stands by Ukraine + video (24.02.2022, Magyar Nemzet), Hungary is Ukraine’s partner in good neighbourly cooperation (24.08.2022, Magyar Nemzet)
66 Toxic Pacifism in Extremist Discourse about the Russia-Ukraine War, Political Capital
67 Viktor Orbán has said his keyword: stay out (2022.07.23, Telex)
Pro-Russian sites

Since the beginning of the war, the Hungarian pro-Russian sites have proactively published on the topic of territorial revisionism. Unlike the far-right actors, they do not formulate clear pro-revisionism narratives – although some of those narratives appeared as well at the beginning. Instead, pro-Russian sites frame various topics as realistic and widely debated options. Such as the possibility of a Hungarian invasion of Ukraine to occupy Subcarpathia; the war as a historic opportunity for Hungary to regain its lost territory; or the possibility of Hungary getting back Subcarpathia from Russia as part of a secret deal. Sometimes they present the news regarding territorial revisionism as disinformation or as information that is very unlikely to happen but cannot be wholly rejected. Their main goal is to keep the topic trending, spread uncertainty and confusion, and incite tensions by presenting Subcarpathia’s annexation by Hungary as a real option.

Map of Medvedev – a case study

The map that Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council and former President Dmitry Medvedev shared on his Telegram channel on the 27th of July was spread in Hungary mainly by far-right and pro-Kremlin sites.

Most of the far-right actors who shared the map did not comment on it, but just gave the context and listed which part of Ukraine would belong to which neighbouring country according to the map. One exemption was a far-right news site closely affiliated with HVIM, one of the largest organizations of the radical and far-right movement in Hungary, which shared the map titled "It is not Russian propaganda; the Russians would give Subcarpathia

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68 Four comments about "Ukraine" (22.02.2022, Hirextra), The Russian foreign minister simply formulated the solution to the Ukrainian conflict (01.03.2022, Hirextra)
69 Hungary can invade Subcarpathia, would Orbán tear a country to pieces? (Titkok Szigete), The Russians raised the question: can Hungary attack Subcarpathia? (Kimondott Igazságok)
70 Putin would give Transcarpathia to the Hungarians: would you accept it? (Kimondott Igazságok), Can Orbán restore Greater Hungary by 2030? Territories will be back, did Trump say it as well? (Titkok Szigete)
71 Will Transcarpathia be annexed by Hungary after the Russian victory? Here is the truth! (03.03.2022, Mindenegyben Blog)
72 A Polish MEP fantasises: Orbán already agreed with Putin on the division of Ukraine (23.03.2022, Hirextra)
73 Hungary leaving the EU as an ally of Putin re-occupying re-gained territories? (Titkok Szigete), Viktor Orbán wants to restore Greater Hungary: does the regaining of the territories come with Putin’s help? (Titkok Szigete)
74 Medvedev published a map attaching Subcarpathia to Hungary - the former president of Russia envisions the division of Ukraine (28.07.2022, Portfolio)
75 According to Medvedev, Transcarpathia will belong to Hungary after the war (27.07.2022, elemi.hu), Medvedev would dismember Ukraine and give Transcarpathia back to us (27.07.2022, kuruc.info)
to us". Besides, some pro-Russian sites framed the content as a realistic option, asking whether the readers would accept the territory if Russia wanted to give it to Hungary. More sites shared the map with the thoughts of Igor Korotchenko, chairman of the Russian Defence Ministry’s Public Council and editor-in-chief of the 'National Defence' magazine, who is on the EU’s sanctions list. He stated that "Hungary has to decide on the fate of Transcarpathia" and whether it would "strengthen its control over its historical territories and save the 150,000 Transcarpathian Hungarians". The articles supplementing the map differentiate between the alleged goals and tactics of Hungary and Poland as follows: "Poland wants to devour a part of Western Ukraine, while Hungary acts nobly, precisely and responsibly".

Examples

Far-right actors actively communicate on the topic of territorial revisionism in Hungary. They state that Transcarpathia needs autonomy, they question Ukraine’s legitimacy as a state and express Hungary’s alleged right to and interest in regaining Transcarpathia.

### Translation:

**Autonomy for Transcarpathia! – Mi Hazánk held a demonstration**

Mi Hazánk demanded the autonomy of Transcarpathia and the rejection of Ukraine’s unconditional EU membership at a demonstration held on Thursday in Budapest, next to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs building.

László Toroczkai, president of the party, emphasised: if the borders of Ukraine are redrawn as a consequence of the war, then it needs to be taken into account that the population of Subcarpathia supported the autonomy of the area in a referendum in 1991!

Source: mihazank.hu, 04.03.2022

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76 It's not Russian propaganda, the Russians would really give Subcarpathia to us (28.07.2022, Szent Korona Rádió)

77 Putin would give Transcarpathia to the Hungarians: would you accept it? (Kimondott Igazságok), The Russians would give Transcarpathia to Hungary: would you accept it? (05.08.2022, Hirextra)

78 Medvedev: Transcarpathia can belong to the Hungarians (30.07.2022, nemzeti.net), The editor-in-chief of a Russian national newspaper confirmed Medvedev’s words that we could get Transcarpathia back (02.08.2022, Szent Korona Rádió), Putin: Hungary must decide on regaining Transcarpathia (Kimondott Igazságok)

79 https://mihazank.hu/autonomiat-karpataljanak-tuntetett-a-mi-hazank/
We have at least 5,749 reasons not to like the Russians (1848+1945+1956), but they are not responsible for the current situation. America’s goal is to screw us over here in Europe while reaping huge profits from arms sales without any real risk. As usual, the EU, this congregation of brainwashed people, makes the worst possible decisions, dragging us into something that has no interest in us.

It's good that we don’t have to give our lives for Ukraine, which has been using the Hungarians trapped there as doormats since its foundation! The return of Subcarpathia can only be in the Hungarian interest in this conflict, even if the masses of do-gooders don't even dare to say this.

Who knows, maybe an opportunity will arise now.

The Trianon Peace Treaty was unjust; everyone knows we have the right to say and represent that.

We should finally get rid of the putty company called the European Union, which has a negative balance sheet in every aspect, and a lot of our energy is taken up by the fight against their bullshit.

Source: Budaházy Edda - Facebook80, 01.03.2022

It's not Russian propaganda; the Russians would really give Transcarpathia to us

Dmitry Medvedev, the former president of Russia and currently an influential politician, shared on social media how he thinks the fate of Ukraine could develop after the war. The politician believes that the idea of Western analysts about the outcome of the conflict does not match the idea of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.

Source: Szent Korona Rádió81, 28.07.2022

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80 https://www.facebook.com/100006072783297/posts/3042752272603836/
Since the beginning of the war, the Hungarian government has expressed its commitment to and support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine.

Photo

Translation:

Post text: Péter Szijjártó announced:
"Hungary's position is clear: we stand for Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Our most important task is to guarantee the safety of the Hungarian people. Our embassy in Kyiv also operates among our representations in Ukraine. We would like to ask Hungarian citizens staying in the eastern or central part of Ukraine to contact the embassy in Kyiv. Our staff are at their disposal, and the embassy, of course, provides security."

Text on the picture: We stand for Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Our most important task is to guarantee the safety of the Hungarian people. Our embassy in Kyiv also operates among our representations in Ukraine.

- Péter Szijjártó -
Source: Fidesz - Facebook82, 24.02.2022

Magyarország Ukrajna partnere a jószomszédi együttműködésben

Translation:

Prime Minister Viktor Orbán supported the sovereignty of Ukraine, the discussion on pending issues and good neighbourly relations in the letter he sent to his Ukrainian counterpart, Denisz Smihal, on the occasion of Ukraine's national holiday, Independence Day, Bertalan Havasi, the Prime Minister's press chief, informed MTI on Monday.

"Hungary has stood up for the preservation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity from the very beginning, and they can count on all of this in the future," stated Viktor Orbán.
Source: Magyar Nemzet83, 24.08.2022

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82 https://www.facebook.com/FideszHU/posts/pfbid082gpna7dgkuzmEeVm2B9V3PGb3gw4MCjyisYX3PsYA3GQrDajNNKT9P3wY1g3U2tl
83 https://magyarnemzet.hu/belfold/2020/08/magyarorszag-ukrajna-partnere-a-joszomszedi-egyuttmukodesben
Pro-Russian sites have actively communicated on the topic of territorial revisionism since the beginning of the war.

**Translation:**

It is about the fact that rumours have been spread for a long time, which claim that Viktor Orbán has been trying to reunite Greater Hungary at an appropriate geopolitical moment for some time. We looked into how big the chances are!

Source: Titkok Szigete – Facebook84, 08.08.2022

**Translation:**

If yes, why? If not, why not? According to the Russians' plans, divided Ukraine would also be "given" to Hungary, i.e. Transcarpathia would be returned to us. What do you think about this? Would it be legitimate, or is it a completely crazy idea that could overturn all international law?

Source: Titkok Terminál – Facebook85, 02.08.2022

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84 https://www.facebook.com/titkokszigete.hu/posts/pfbid0cVjJNrbTB7UbYf4Uewrd3h1UJrRsqjMLDMKcPQnyp3CdfznravfjmHKj2DpHzvTI

85 https://www.facebook.com/titokterminal/posts/pfbid0HpFp8xEGyjKQmLwWTNpRPkrULZeV9o2GwyUCRXeRc15cb4U2Fvtwn7qV9zPrYrpcl
Will Transcarpathia be annexed to Hungary after the Russian victory? Here is the truth! The article can be read in the comments!

Source: Mindenegyben blog – Facebook86, 003.03.2022

Medvedev: Transcarpathia can belong to the Hungarians

Ever since the former Russian President Medvedev put the map on the Internet showing Transcarpathia as part of Hungary, there has been speculation that this is another hoax, the Russians really have this plan, or that the Russian politician is just joking on the West.

Medvedev's map was a response to Ukrainian President Zelensky. Zelensky drew a large Ukraine; in response, Medvedev posted a map on his social media page, saying that Western analysts believed the war's end would be different.

On his map, Transcarpathia belongs to Hungary, but Poland and Romania also "get" parts of Ukraine.

Russian military expert: The Hungarians can get Transcarpathia back

Source: Orientalista87, 30.07.2022

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86 Mindenegyben blog – Facebook
87 https://orientalista.hu/medvegyev-a-magyaroke-lehet-karpatalja/